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Introduction 
 
 
Colombia’s Peace and Venezuela’s Turmoil 
An Emerging Regional Crisis Landscape in South America 
Günther Maihold 
Despite concerted political efforts to isolate the Colombian peace process from Vene-
zuela’s internal unrest, the signs suggest coalescence and tectonic strife in the region. 
There are justified concerns that the increasingly interconnected constellation of pre-
carious peace in Colombia and growing authoritarianism in Venezuela could generate 
new dynamics of violence. The two Andean neighbours are so closely connected by 
ideological confrontation, border disputes, illegal violent actors, migration flows, the 
narcotics trade and economic exchange that the individual problems become almost 
indistinguishable – both within and between the two countries. The bottom line is 
that the political and economic crisis in Venezuela is eroding efforts to consolidate 
peace efforts in Colombia. Avoiding lasting harm will require the two states to pursue 
integrated solutions supported by the international community. 
 
Colombia and Venezuela are closely bound 
together by the ongoing Colombian peace 
process. Caracas served as a guarantor at 
the Havana talks that in November 2016 – 
after more than five years – produced a peace 
agreement between the Colombian govern-
ment under President Juan Manuel Santos 
and the leadership of the FARC guerrilla 
group. Nevertheless, relations between the 
two countries have been dogged by a succes-
sion of conflicts. Now a new stage of escala-
tion looms in the context of the political cri-
sis in Venezuela; the legitimacy of the Vene-
zuelan constituent assembly is contested, 
and the presidential and parliamentary 
elections it arranged are challenged (see p. 5). 
Mutual recriminations and threats strain 
the relationship, and bilateral contacts be-
tween the governments are on ice. Grounds 
exist for concern that the crisis in Vene-
zuela could spill over into Colombia and 
further complicate or even endanger the 
still young peace process there: the situa-
tion on the shared border remains tense 
while the burden of provisioning and ac-
commodating Venezuelan migrants in 
Colombia is growing. The upcoming elec-
tions – parliamentary in March 2018 and 
presidential in May – are already affecting 
Colombian politics. The national reconcilia-
tion process is at risk, as the election cam-
paign sharpens the polarisation between 
supporters and opponents of the peace 
settlement. 
The Colombian government is also under 
pressure from the United States to tackle 
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coca production, which is rising again. The 
transit routes for cocaine exports to the US 
and European markets lead through Vene-
zuela, where they further corrupt the power 
structures. Parts of Venezuela’s military 
apparatus and political elites are known 
to be involved in the drug trade and are 
subject to investigations and blacklisting 
by the US authorities. In Colombia in turn, 
criminal post-conflict structures (compris-
ing former FARC fighters and rearmed para-
militaries) supply incentives to continue 
participating in the drug trade. This does 
lasting harm to the Colombian peace pro-
cess, cementing existing violent conditions 
in the border region and beyond. 
Colombia’s Fragile Peace 
Since the Colombian peace agreement 
came into effect the FARC guerrilla fighters 
have been successfully disarmed and demo-
bilised, and the peace process has entered a 
new phase. The next stage is the (re-)integra-
tion of almost seven thousand fighters into 
society. As such, “territorial peace” becomes 
the central dimension of state action. Far-
reaching processes of local reconciliation 
and development forums need to be set 
in motion, in order to enable peaceful co-
existence on the basis of transitional jus-
tice, acknowledgement of guilt, amnesty 
processes and political participation. The 
UN is supporting this new phase through 
a new verification mission mandated by 
the Security Council. The first UN mission, 
deployed after the peace agreement, com-
pleted its work of monitoring the disarma-
ment of the FARC slightly behind schedule 
on 25 September 2017. 
But progress on the economic, social and 
political reintegration of demobilised fight-
ers is slow, and enforcement of security 
guarantees is patchy. Assassinations disrupt 
the process: in 2017 more than 75 social 
and ethnic minority leaders and representa-
tives of human rights groups were murdered. 
Attacks on former FARC fighters endanger 
the trust required for their successful re-
integration into society. Observers also esti-
mate that between 150 and 800 former 
fighters have quit the organisation to pur-
sue criminal activities on their own ac-
count. One obvious field of activity is drug 
cultivation and trade. The area used for this 
in Colombia grew by 52 percent between 
2015 and 2016. According to calculations 
by the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) the country’s cocaine pro-
duction probably increased by 34 percent. 
Against this pressure, the government’s 
National Comprehensive Program for the 
Substitution of Illicit Crops (PNIS) is impo-
tent. It seeks to convert 100,000 hectares 
from coca production to legal crops, but 
has to date achieved only 5 percent of 
that target. Coca farmers and Venezuelan 
migrants are blamed for unrest and road 
blockades, especially in the border region 
with Venezuela (Catatumbo/Cúcuta). 
The Colombian government is not only 
under pressure to implement the peace pro-
cess more dynamically to avoid disappoint-
ing high expectations; in fact material 
living conditions have worsened and many 
fundamental promises made in the peace 
agreement remain unfulfilled. One of the 
central problems is the slowness of action 
by government and parliament, with delays 
in passing the necessary transitional justice 
legislation (Justicia Especial para la Paz) 
and appointing judges to administer it. 
Administrative capacities for developing 
a state presence in regions formerly con-
trolled by the guerrillas are also lacking, 
and funding options for integrating 
displaced persons and former fighters are 
limited. The latter would require economic 
development, infrastructure investment 
and projects promoting legal agriculture 
and founding small businesses. The lack of 
such opportunities calls into question the 
sustainability of the demobilisation, and 
in turn increases the danger of ex-fighters 
drifting into crime. This not least also weak-
ens the already precarious public support 
for the peace process. 
The “fast track” for expedited adoption 
of numerous laws associated with the peace 
agreement ended in November 2017. Now 
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the legislative process is subjugated to the 
logic of the election campaign. Of the 24 
central legislative initiatives that were sup-
posed to be realised under the fast-track 
rule, only ten succeeded. The political re-
form to reorganise electoral constituencies 
in the former FARC regions failed com-
pletely. With President Santos’s governing 
coalition disbanded for the election cam-
paign, many of the pending bills associated 
with the peace agreement are likely to be 
put on ice. And even the legislation that has 
been adopted still has to be approved by the 
Supreme Court, further delaying the point 
where it comes into effect. So now institu-
tional and political calculations override 
the peace goals of the Santos government. 
The latter remains in office for another 
seven months, which is likely to be a diffi-
cult time in view of the expected realign-
ment of political forces. 
The election campaign itself plays a 
part in eroding the consensus for the peace 
settlement, with an ideological controversy 
over “Castro-Chavismo” inflaming passions: 
Parts of the conservative opposition stoke 
fears that “Venezuelan conditions” associated 
with socio-economic decline and political 
turmoil in the neighbouring country could 
infect Colombia when the FARC enters the 
electoral arena. The spectres they invoke 
include material shortages, abolition of pri-
vate property, persecution of political oppo-
nents and subversion of the armed forces. 
To that extent Venezuela’s crisis is directly 
implicated in the internal conflicts in Co-
lombia, where it exacerbates polarisation 
over the legitimacy and provisions of the 
peace agreement. This can be expected to 
lead to a situation where internal political 
priorities shape the political and legal inter-
pretation of the agreement, and the peace 
process loses transformative thrust and 
becomes sidelined. The FARC is already 
complaining (not without reason) that the 
government’s lateness in implementing 
particular elements is significantly skewing 
the internal logic of the agreement. This 
applies not least to the integration of de-
mobilised fighters. According to the UN, 
55 percent have already left the designated 
transition zones because of the lack of state 
provision for reintegration and training, 
looking to make their own way instead. 
Peace Talks with ELN Stalled 
The Colombian government’s cease-fire 
with the – still armed and active – ELN 
guerrilla group expired on 9 January 2018. 
Talks in the Ecuadorian capital Quito aim-
ing to extend the agreement were suspended 
after ELN fighters attacked demobilised 
FARC members, police stations and mem-
bers of the security organs. 
It is currently hard to imagine a success-
ful peace process with the ELN occurring 
before President Santos steps down. The 
ELN is a much more difficult counterpart 
than the FARC, with a decentralised organi-
sational structure requiring protracted in-
ternal coordinating processes. At the same 
time the Colombian armed forces have 
stepped up their operations against the ELN, 
degrading what little trust did exist. Nor 
does the government want to expose itself 
during the election campaign to accusa-
tions that it is taking an overly conciliatory 
stance. The ELN also operates in regions 
bordering Venezuela, where it further in-
flames an already complex situation: Colom-
bia’s borders see a superposition of crimi-
nal activities, guerrilla operations and mas-
sive migratory movements. 
Migration Pressure and Border Security 
The problematic situation at the Colom-
bian-Venezuelan border is a central ele-
ment of the new crisis landscape in the 
northern Andes. Many Venezuelans have 
sought respite from the humanitarian 
crisis by emigrating to Colombia and Brazil. 
Massive migration movements that have 
been set in motion – above all towards 
Colombia – that threaten peaceful co-
existence. Here the historical situation is 
reversed: during the post-1970 oil boom 
many Colombians sought a better life in 
Venezuela. 
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According to the Colombian government 
more than 600,000 persons from Venezuela 
immigrated in the past eighteen months, not 
counting Colombian returnees. Complete 
economic collapse would lead to a dramatic 
increase in the numbers. Altogether 1.2 mil-
lion Venezuelans are believed to have relo-
cated to Colombia for economic or political 
reasons. Providing for this influx presents 
increasing logistical and social problems 
in a difficult post-conflict context, and anti-
Venezuelan reactions have been reported. 
The migration creates turmoil at the 
2,200-kilometre border between the two 
countries, where violent incidents have al-
ready been reported. Economic crises have 
repeatedly led to closure of the six official 
border crossings, most recently in August 
2016. Colombia is now committing more 
troops to the border region, but with 288 
informal crossing points, the border must 
be regarded as porous. The region is char-
acterised by legal and illegal trade, indig-
enous groups whose territories straddle the 
border, and shared ecological challenges. 
The issue of border security is of central 
importance, and is complicated by the 
breadth of problems that come together in 
the region: massive migration flows, drug 
transit routes, ELN hideouts and growing 
smuggling between the two countries. 
Especially during election campaigns, 
the question of border management gets 
instrumentalised to domestic ends. The 
interests of guerrilla groups, resurgent 
paramilitaries and criminal organisations 
are multifariously interwoven with formal 
and informal entities at the border and 
within the border region, including control 
instances on both sides, military forces and 
state-sponsored Venezuelan gangs. Pressure 
of migration generates its own conflict con-
stellations, as well as expanding the oppor-
tunities offered by the black economy. With 
no prospect of a joint border policy, the 
problem threatens to spiral out of control. 
A deliberate or accidental provocation by 
the border police or the military can easily 
escalate. There is an urgent need for recip-
rocal crisis intervention mechanisms to 
prevent conflicts at the border spiralling 
out of control. 
Consequences for Economic Development 
Multiple sensitivities and interdependen-
cies make the relationship between Colom-
bia and Venezuela a political management 
conundrum. Confrontation can easily mar 
the bilateral relationship where internal 
difficulties are projected on the respective 
neighbour. Before President Hugo Chávez 
initiated the era of restrictive economic 
policies in 2009 Venezuela was Colombia’s 
second-largest trading partner (after the 
United States), supplying industrial prod-
ucts and increasingly also basic foodstuffs. 
In 2007 17 percent of Colombia’s foreign 
trade was with Venezuela; by 2016 the 
figure had fallen to just 0.5 percent. Trade 
is hampered by the Venezuelan govern-
ment’s three different official dollar ex-
change rates, in addition to the black mar-
ket rate. Many Colombian firms – most 
recently the airline Avianca – have ceased 
operating in Venezuela after suffering 
massive dollar conversion losses. 
Growing asymmetries between the two 
countries hamper economic development. 
Venezuela operates a planned economy; 
Colombia has free-market competition 
with open markets. Given the differences 
between the economic systems, imbalances 
are inevitable, with massive price differ-
ences for strategic goods generating im-
mediate demand across the border. This 
applies to state-subsidised vehicle fuel in 
Venezuela, which attracts Colombian pur-
chasers. Conversely dramatic shortages of 
food and medicines in Venezuela generate 
enormous local border traffic with Colom-
bia, placing great strains on Colombian 
healthcare infrastructure and distribution 
systems in communities close to the borders. 
The trade in fuel, livestock, food, gold 
and people is increasingly organised 
through illicit channels and smuggling. It 
is believed that goods worth US$1 million 
cross the border unrecorded on a daily 
basis. New paramilitaries, ELN fighters and 
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Chavist collectives compete for control of 
the border, which also represents one of 
the most important transit routes for the 
international cocaine trade. Incursions 
by Venezuelan armed forces are a regular 
occurrence, seeking to counter the im-
pression that Venezuelan society is haem-
orrhaging through emigration and eco-
nomic decline. 
Venezuela’s Protracted Crisis 
No other state in Latin America currently 
suffers such a multitude of overlapping 
crises as Venezuela. The state is on the verge 
of bankruptcy, the population experienc-
ing a humanitarian crisis, and the politi-
cal situation characterised by an openly 
authoritarian centralisation of power. Presi-
dent Nicolás Maduro recently announced 
that opposition parties that boycotted the 
December 2017 local elections will be ex-
cluded from the presidential election on 
20 May 2018. 
Venezuela is heavily dependent on its oil 
industry, with oil exports accounting for 96 
percent of foreign exchange revenues. Low 
oil prices have created a massive crisis in 
state finances. Apparently the country now 
intends to “restructure” its debt, worsening 
its international credit ratings and bringing 
it ever closer to default. The IMF put Vene-
zuelan inflation at 2,400 percent in 2017, 
with the economy shrinking by 12 percent. 
Foreign debt amounts to $120 billion, with 
a large proportion due in the coming ten 
years. The loans taken out by the state oil 
company PDVSA are especially relevant, 
because its extensive oil reserves serve to 
backstop the state budget. Production infra-
structure is deteriorating rapidly due to 
lack of investment. Whereas at the end of 
the 1990s Venezuela was still producing 
3.2 million barrels per day, the figure 
had fallen to just 1.9 million by October 
2017. Even if Venezuela is still the United 
States’ third-largest oil supplier, with 7 
percent market share, the corresponding 
dollar revenues no longer cover its import 
needs. 
General Manuel Quevedo’s recent 
appointment as president of the PDVSA 
underlines the strength of the military’s 
grip on the levers of power. The armed 
forces also control the distribution sys-
tems for food and medicines. The growing 
“militarisation” of the post-Chavist system 
reveals how President Maduro is seeking to 
preserve his power via the security organs. 
These at the same time become the cen-
tral pillars of the state-run economic and 
social programmes. With the decline of the 
national production apparatus the country 
becomes increasingly dependent on exter-
nal lenders and states like China, Russia 
and India. Buying up worthless debt secures 
them influence over Venezuela’s resources 
sector and shares of the country’s oil reserves. 
Maduro is always inventing new tricks to 
stabilise the economy and improve the sup-
ply situation. These include the announced 
introduction of the resource-backed crypto-
currency “Petro”, which is the first digital 
state currency. The crypto-Petro is to be 
closely tied to the oil price, and guaranteed 
by Venezuela’s enormous oil and gas reserves 
as well as its gold and diamond deposits. 
The white paper on its introduction states 
that the Petro will be used for investment, 
savings and international financial trans-
fers, and serve all citizens to pay taxes and 
state services. It is hoped that tying the cur-
rency to the oil price will reduce inflation-
ary pressure and achieve greater independ-
ence from the US dollar. After US$735 
million were raised in the first days of the 
Petro pre-sale, Maduro has announced that 
he will launch the Petro Gold as an addi-
tional crypo-currency in order to capture 
further international funds. 
The one-month pre-sale period began on 
20 February 2018. Caracas hopes this will 
supply an injection of fresh capital and 
serve to stabilise the national economy. It is 
planned to issue 100 million Petros, backed 
by 100 million barrels of the country’s oil 
reserves, in order to raise $5.9 billion. As 
such, the Petro could potentially rebuild 
the country’s access to the international 
financial markets. But there must be doubts 
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as to whether it can really succeed in in-
sulating Venezuela from the international 
oil market, which remains tied to the US 
dollar. Domestic disruption could easily 
send the Petro into a downward spiral, if 
access to the guaranteed oil were called 
into question. The parliament, which 
Maduro has frozen out, has already called 
the Petro “unconstitutional contraction 
of debt” because it lacks parliamentary 
approval. So the new funding instrument 
is in no way immune to the political crisis. 
The Weakness of the Opposition 
On 30 July 2017 Venezuela elected a con-
stituent assembly, granting President 
Maduro an instrument to enforce his in-
terests. After the opposition-dominated 
National Assembly was suspended, all state 
institutions are now subordinated to the 
new organ. Through a tactical combination 
of repression and negotiation Maduro has 
succeeded in wearing down the opposition 
and neutralising its pressure on the regime. 
The opposition alliance Mesa de Unidad 
Democrática (MUD) is significantly weakened, 
after Maduro successfully played its leaders 
against each other. While the opposition 
was still able to organise massive protests 
in mid-2017, today it is largely toothless. 
The reason for this is not least that civil 
society has largely withdrawn from politi-
cal life. Ordinary people no longer believe 
they can improve their situation by taking 
to the streets. As such the opposition par-
ties have lost both their institutional base 
and their social roots. Instead they rely 
increasingly strongly on the international 
community to press for their demands in 
talks with the government (most recently 
in the Dominican Republic). Four points are 
central: recognition of the humanitarian 
crisis by the government, reinstatement of 
the National Assembly; agreement on a de-
pendable electoral calendar; and release of 
the 300 political prisoners. 
The government has shown no sign of 
granting any of these demands. The oppo-
sition finds itself facing an intransigent 
regime that prefers to play for time rather 
than enter into serious negotiations. Nor 
has it received much help from the infor-
mal Lima group of fourteen American 
states, whose latest meeting in Santiago de 
Chile unanimously rejected the early presi-
dential election in Venezuela, asserting that 
it would “lack legitimacy and credibility”. 
While some of the Venezuelan opposition 
parties wanted to negotiate with the gov-
ernment about election modalities, others 
refused due to the failure of guarantees. 
The common position for a boycott of the 
elections has been undermined by one op-
position leader, who announced his can-
didacy at the last moment. This means the 
chances of united front remain small and 
the centrifugal forces are only likely to be 
accelerated by the government’s tactical 
manoeuvring. Maduro denounces the op-
position in nationalist declarations, accus-
ing it of being externally controlled from 
Washington and Bogotá. The Trump Ad-
ministration’s sanctions and Colombia’s 
rejection of his government allow Maduro 
to present himself as the defender of 
national sovereignty. 
Options in a Region of Crisis 
The constellation of problems within and 
between Colombia and Venezuela is extreme-
ly complex, with multiple overlapping and 
interlocking conflicts. Navigating this land-
scape of crisis requires efforts at the national 
and regional level. Positive impulses from 
Latin America are not to be expected, as 
the existing regional crisis management 
mechanisms – such as the Union of South 
American Nations (UNASUR) – have largely 
fallen into abeyance, while the Lima group 
restricts itself to joint declarations. The 
international community is called upon. 
It is already active in the region through 
its engagement in Colombia’s peace pro-
cess as well as (fruitless) mediation efforts 
in Venezuela. Integrated solutions are 
needed, encompassing the national, bi-
national and regional dimensions of the 
conflict. 
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First of all the ideological fixation of 
Colombia’s domestic politics needs to be 
overcome. Currently every political turn 
in Venezuela finds immediate resonance 
in Colombia’s overheated election atmos-
phere, to the detriment of the bilateral 
relationship. Unless the obsession with the 
“bad” neighbour can be laid aside, there is 
little chance of reining in the repercussions 
of relentless authoritarianism in Venezuela 
on the Colombian peace process. Numerous 
bilateral problems are on the table and 
need to be dealt with. Above all the border 
region needs to be pacified: this is where 
old and new conflict constellations overlap, 
with the greatest risk of various forms of 
violence flaring up. Investment in infra-
structure is needed to create economic in-
centives for reintegration of former FARC 
fighters. Otherwise there is a danger of 
them switching to the ELN forces or to 
criminal and paramilitary groups operating 
in the border region. Regional reconcilia-
tion forums and development committees 
need to quickly begin (and complete) their 
work in order to guarantee conditions 
under which economic dynamism can 
emerge in hitherto marginalised regions. 
Drug transit through Venezuela must also 
be stopped; it opens up access to massive 
resources and fuels political conflicts. This 
is a task above all for the Colombia security 
organs; no support can be expected from 
the Venezuelan side, where parts of the 
armed forces are themselves involved in 
the drug trade. 
The elections scheduled for 2018 in both 
countries currently offer little prospect of 
lasting impulses for a transformation of the 
confrontative relationship. In the event of 
electoral fraud occurring again, Venezuela’s 
weak opposition will be able to achieve little 
in the country’s centrally controlled insti-
tutions. Even if the international community 
refuses to recognise the result the regime 
in Caracas is likely to be able to maintain 
its grip on power, regardless of the precari-
ous living conditions of large sections of 
the population. A new decree that declares 
political criticism to be a “hate crime” sub-
ject to prosecution demonstrates the kind 
of persecution oppositionists can continue 
to expect. At the same time the government 
is relying on a rising oil price expanding its 
financial leeway. In Colombia the signs are 
that the election will be won by forces cam-
paigning on criticism of the peace agreement 
and a policy of distancing from Venezuela. 
The already fragile peace process could thus 
become even more solidly bogged down, 
especially as no sustained civil society pres-
sure for implementation can be expected. 
It is incumbent upon the international 
community to prevent the various crises 
and tensions in Colombian-Venezuelan rela-
tions from spiralling. Most urgently needed 
is the establishment of a humanitarian cor-
ridor in Venezuela to address the shortages 
of food and medicines. Given that President 
Maduro has to date rejected such a meas-
ure, the idea of using the funds to aid Vene-
zuelan citizens who have fled to Colombia 
could be considered – even if this would in 
the short term create additional incentives 
for migration. 
The United States and the European 
Union have imposed sanctions on Vene-
zuela, designed to increase the costs the 
Maduro government incurs for its course. 
This applies to the country’s access to the 
international finance markets, but also to 
personal resources that representatives of 
the regime have generally parked abroad. 
But punishment is only one side of the coin. 
There also needs to be an incentive, a prom-
ise that costs will fall if the country returns 
to democratic rule. On the way there a tran-
sition plan needs to be drawn up – with the 
participation of the opposition – that con-
tains elements of an economic adjustment 
policy and also provides for the various 
powers of the country to function in an 
orderly manner again. Questions of national 
and international prosecution are of cen-
tral importance for members of the Maduro 
regime, and will need to be clarified. This 
could offer the starting point to sensibly 
interlink the different levels of crisis and 
tackle the Venezuelan-Colombian crisis 
landscape in an integrated manner. 
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